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“Civilizing” the Amazon: Amerindians and the
Portuguese Crown’s Struggle for Sovereignty, 
1650-1777
HELENA NUNES DUARTE 
Abstract
This article examines Portuguese colonization techniques in northern Brazil
and subsequent changes during the regime of the Marquis of Pombal (1750-
1777), which centred on restructuring defence, settlement, and the role of
natives in the colonies. Focusing on the 1758 Indian Directorate, a collection
of laws on native policy, the article examines how, despite the Enlightenment
humanitarian trappings of the reform, it had a far more complex purpose than
merely converting Indians into loyal subjects of the Portuguese crown. The leg-
islation was just one part of a multi-faceted attempt to establish the crown’s
sovereignty in the Amazon, which included taking power from the Jesuits, sub-
jugating the natives, defining imperial territory, and asserting economic
independence.
Résumé
Cet article examine les techniques de colonisation portugaises dans le nord du
Brésil et les changements qui ont suivi le régime du Marquis de Pombal (1750-
1777), centrées sur la restructuration de la défense, la colonisation et le rôle
des autochtones dans les colonies. En mettant l’accent sur l’administration
indienne de 1758, une série de lois sur la politique autochtone, l’article exam-
ine comment, en dépit de tous les signes humanitaires extérieurs d’illumination
de la réforme, elle avait un objectif beaucoup plus complexe que la simple con-
version des Indiens en de loyaux sujets de la couronne portugaise. La
législation n’était qu’une partie de la tentative à volets multiples d’établir la
souveraineté de la couronne en Amazonie, c’est-à-dire soutirer le pouvoir aux
jésuites, subjuguer les autochtones, définir le territoire impérial et faire valoir
l’indépendance économique.
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In the mid-eighteenth century, Portuguese America was struggling after theend of the “Golden Age” of Brazil, which spanned the first half of the cen-
tury and saw the influx of wealth into Portuguese coffers. João V, “the
Magnanimous,” died in 1750 after a reign of spending the new-found riches of
Brazilian gold and diamonds on public works and the Church.1 However, the
wealth did not stimulate improvements in agriculture, industry, civilian admin-
istration or the military.2 In fact, the Portuguese empire suffered from a trade
deficit, for which only the export of Brazilian specie could compensate, and the
crown had little real power in Brazil, the jewel that sustained Portuguese trade
by providing bullion. The Portuguese had pushed west in South America, but
there were no real lines of demarcation, no defined imperial territory.
Moreover, even if the Portuguese sovereign governed regions like the Amazon
in theory, the missionaries and the natives controlled the region in practice.
Amazonian town councils, residents, plantation owners and governors all
resented the structure of power in the region, as they repeatedly asked the
crown to free the native labourers controlled by the Jesuits, or to authorize and
subsidize the import of African slaves. A power struggle developed between the
administration and the Jesuits, as the religious order clearly controlled the fron-
tiers of the empire. However, during the Pombaline administration, issues of
government control became prominent, especially when it came to emphasiz-
ing the sovereignty of José I. 
During the reign of José I, or more precisely the dynamic government of
his secretary of state, the Marquis of Pombal, which governed from 1750 to
1777, the Amazon region underwent systematic reforms involving significant
political, military, economic, administrative and religious aspects. The crown
questioned the role of each subject within the empire, attempting to consolidate
and demonstrate its power, especially in relation to natives. During its first
decade in power, the administration issued three laws regarding the governance
of natives in Grão Pará and Maranhão: the law of 6 June 1755 restoring Indian
liberty, the law of 7 June 1757 removing the natives from the Jesuits’ temporal
control, and the 1758 laws that created the Indian Directorate.3 This reform pro-
ject and its execution generated bitter conflict among the missionaries, the
natives, the colonists and the administration. The Jesuit order, which lost its
1 I wish to thank Hendrik Kraay for his comments, Joan Sangster for her patience, and the
anonymous reviewers of the Canadian Historical Association. 
2 Charles Boxer, The Golden Age of Brazil, 1695-1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1962), 321.
3 For some academics, the term “Indian” is considered inappropriate because of its origins in
European colonialism. I use the terms “native” and “indigenous” particularly when generaliz-
ing about different native groups in the Amazon region. However, I often use the term “Indian”
when I am talking about colonial structures and the colonial regimes’ relationship to subjected
indigenous peoples in that the crown classified them officially as índios or “Indians.” 
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power in the empire, culminating in its expulsion from the Amazon and
Portugal in 1759 and the remaining Portuguese possessions in 1760, was par-
ticularly affected by the changes imposed by the crown.
This article examines the new colonization techniques implemented by the
Portuguese in northern Brazil during the Pombaline era, focusing on changes in
defence and settlement, and how they focused on the indigenous population. In
the Amazonian state of Grão Pará and Maranhão, the crown, represented by
Francisco Xavier de Mendonça Furtado (Pombal’s brother), clearly changed its
attitudes toward Amerindians on the frontier in the hope that they would
become active participants in defending royal sovereignty in the region.
Colonization techniques used on the Brazilian frontier demonstrated a new
Catholic ideology that centred its attention on “humanizing” or “civilizing” the
native population through a process of assimilation. In 1758, this took on the
form of the Directorate, a collection of laws on native policy, which despite its
Enlightenment humanitarian trappings, had a far more complex purpose than
merely converting Indians into loyal subjects of the Portuguese crown. The pri-
mary focus of this article is not the examination of how the Indian Directorate
affected the native population, but rather how the legislation was just one part
of a multi-faceted approach for establishing the crown’s sovereignty in the
Amazon, which included taking power from the Jesuits, subjecting natives,
defining imperial territory and asserting economic independence.4
Francisco Xavier de Mendonça Furtado
In early 1751, José I appointed Francisco Xavier de Mendonça Furtado to the
post of governor and captain general of Maranhão “for three years or more until
a successor [was] sent.”5 On 24 September 1751, Mendonça Furtado succeeded
Governor Francisco Pedro Gorjão de Mendonça and took office in Belém do
Pará. The new governor had already been in Brazil as part of Commander Luís
de Brederode’s fleet, serving in Sacramento. In fact, Mendonça Furtado’s
appointment cited his previous merits and services to the crown explaining that,
therefore, the king was confident that he would carry out his duties compe-
tently.6
4 For a detailed discussion on the colonization of natives see John Hemming, Red Gold: The
Conquest of the Brazilian Indians (London: Macmillian, 1978); Amazon Frontier: The Defeat
of the Brazilian Indians (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987); Mathias C. Kieman,
Indian Policy of Portugal in the Amazon Region, 1614-1693 (New York: Octagon Books,
1973) .
5 Francisco Pedro Gorjão de Mendonça to Mendonça Furtado, Belém, 7 June 1751, Arquivo
Nacional/Torre do Tombo (hereafter cited as ANTT), Chancelaria de D. José I, Livro 82, fl.
377.
6 Ibid.
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Mendonça Furtado’s long civil and military career exemplified the gov-
erning ideology of the administration of his brother, the Marquis of Pombal,
and José I. His knowledge of cartography enabled him to undertake the ardu-
ous task of demarcating the borders of northern Brazil, the principal reason that
he was named the minister plenipotentiary in the region. More importantly, the
appointment of Mendonça Furtado as governor and captain-general of the state
of Grão Pará and Maranhão signified the inception of the Pombaline strategies
and reforms for the occupation and development of the vast northern region of
Brazil.
King José I had inherited a global empire that was losing its economic
power, especially in the area of Asian commerce. In fact, the rapid deterioration
of the empire became increasingly alarming for the administration, leading the
crown to look at Brazil’s economic potential. With proper development, the
Americas could provide the natural resources and products required by a
demanding pre-industrial Europe. In addition, Portugal suffered from a severe
trade imbalance, with imperial capital going more or less directly to imports
coming from other countries, such as England, and something had to be done
to boost the Portuguese economy. Therefore, producing and exporting products
from Brazil became more important, particularly with the discovery of gold and
diamonds in Brazil and the loss of Asian markets.
For various reasons, the vast Amazon rainforest was a major obstacle for
Portuguese colonization in northern Brazil during the eighteenth century. The
population consisted of a few Amerindian villages, with hardly any whites and
African slaves. Although it is difficult to find population estimates, the region
was sparsely populated, lacking any real population density and suffering from
high mortality rates.7 Epidemic outbreaks were common and killed thousands.
A smallpox epidemic claimed approximately 40,000 victims between 1743 and
1747. Popular resistance to vaccination meant that it took a long time to over-
come smallpox, despite the fact that a Carmelite missionary attempted the first
Latin American inoculations in the Amazon region in 1729.8 For the Portuguese
crown, the Amazon represented an economic reserve that had never produced
large quantities of commercial goods due to a lack of labour to clear the land
and exploit the potential fountain of riches. The lack of systematic production
and exportation translated into a subsistence economy, in which the residents
did not contribute to the royal treasury.
Ironically, the very jungle that the Portuguese wished to tame, rich in
plants and oily seeds, constituted the primary source of income for the colonists
7 Hemming, 445.
8 D. Sweet, “A Rich Realm of Nature Destroyed” (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin, 1971),
88; David Cleary, “Towards an Environmental History of the Amazon: From Prehistory to the
Nineteenth Century,” Latin American Research Review 36 (2001): 64-94.
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and natives. The indigenous slaves collected the products, which included
cacao, cinnamon, annatto, vanilla, sugar cane, fine and coarse cloves, cotton,
and wood of various species.9 These products would then be transported to
Europe, where they had a guaranteed market and served as an alternative to
spices from the Orient. Certainly, the crown was not indifferent to the natural
resources available in the region and knew that if production was stimulated the
Portuguese empire could reassert itself on the international spice and drug mar-
ket. In addition, missionaries, especially those from the Society of Jesus, had
colonized the Amazonian region. The majority of the Portuguese inhabitants
belonged to the regular clergy: Franciscan, Carmelite, Mercedarian or Jesuit.
The Jesuits owned the larger operations of agriculture, silviculture, fishing and
ranching. In addition, the Society of Jesus administrated the majority of the
native reduction villages in Pará and Maranhão.10
The Pombaline political objectives for northern Brazil were too ambitious
to be undertaken by the colonists who resided in the region. Neither the colo-
nial elite nor the missionary republic were congruent with the new direction of
the enlightened, absolute monarchy of the mid-eighteenth century. Also, some
Carmelite missions on the Rio Negro, Rio Madeira and Rio Javari, and the São
Pedro and São Paulo Jesuit missions on the Amazon functioned as advanced
posts of penetration under the sovereignty of the Spanish crown. It is important
to note that after many years of drawn-out negotiations concerning the frontier
between Portuguese and Spanish America, the Treaty of Madrid was signed in
1750 and approved the topographical survey and border demarcation between
the two respective administrations. In light of the new treaty, securing
Portuguese sovereignty in the Amazon was imperative and urgent, requiring
immediate organization to demarcate, fortify, inhabit and develop the region.
Therefore, to defend Portuguese possessions from neighbouring powers the
new governor had to strengthen the region’s defences, which the Overseas
Council (the government organization responsible for all colonial matters) rec-
ognized as incipient and undisciplined. Also, the governor had to fortify and
build new fortresses at strategic locations, both on the coast and in the interior.
Mendonça Furtado wasted no time in investigating Grão Pará and
Maranhão and reporting his findings to the crown. He received much informa-
tion from the Bishop of Pará, the city council of Belém, and the civilians of the
9 For more detailed description of Amazonian products see Cleary, “Towards an Environmental
History,” 83; António Carreira, A Companhia Geral do Grão Pará e Maranhão (São Paulo:
Editora Nacional, 1988); Diccionário histórico, geographico ethnographico de Brasil (Rio de
Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1922). 
10 Isabel Vieira Rodrigues, “A governação do Francisco Xavier de Mendonça Furtado,” Revista
Oceanos 40 (1999): 97; Conquista recuperada e liberdade restituída. 1759. Biblioteca
Nacional de Lisboa (hereafter cited as BNL), R, CP (Reservados, Pombaline Collection), Cod.
639.
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region who cooperated with the government. However, judging by the corre-
spondence of the governor, his reforming task would be difficult to undertake.
In his first letter to his brother – a personal one – he apologetically revealed his
perception of the Amazon and the problems that he faced: “The issue that I have
the intention of describing in this report is such, and so lamentable, that even to
treat you like a brother whom I cordially love, seems violent and repugnant.”11
Despite his relatively positive opinion of the natives of the region (“docile, easy
to persuade and extremely able”) the governor was appalled by the Portuguese
settlers and missionaries.12 Not only were the missionaries unfruitful at “saving
the infinite souls that every day [were] lost,” but they also did not take advan-
tage of Amazonian resources. Worse yet, “many Christians have not only taken
some of the gentile’s customs, but have also followed their rituals,” and those
who went native even included “many ecclesiastics.”13 Mendonça Furtado
directed much of his frustration at the regular clergy. The crown had originally
entrusted the missionaries with the spiritual and temporal responsibilities of
Christianizing and civilizing the native population, but ecclesiastical control
over mission villages had degenerated into a violent “tyranny” that left the
natives “wailing under the weight placed on them by the ambition and pride of
the Regulars.”14 The governor went so far as to declare that the “abominable
vice of avarice” demonstrated by the missionaries caused “civil war between
the people, even the missionaries.”15
For the governor, the inability of the Portuguese missionaries to “civilize”
the native population was indicative of a problem with asserting royal author-
ity in the region. Worse yet, “neither justice nor king” were recognized in the
Amazon.16 Language became an especially contentious issue in the Amazon.
Despite government orders issued in 1688, 1728, and 1751 to instruct natives
in Portuguese, the missionaries used native languages for religious instruction.
Not only did the missionaries thus defy a direct royal order, but their failure to
teach Portuguese ensured a continuation of traditional beliefs and polytheistic
practices, for the limitations of native vocabulary made effective Christian -
ization impossible.17 The Jesuit missionaries argued that Pope Alexander VII
had ordered evangelization in the language of the perspective converts back in
11 Mendonça Furtado to Marquis of Pombal, Belém, 21 November 1751, in A Amazônia na era
pombalina: Correspondência inédita de governador e capitão-general do estado do Grão
Pará e Maranhão Francisco Xavier de Mendonça Furtado, 1751-1759 (hereafter cited as
AEP), ed. Marcos Carneiro de Mendonça (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Histórico e Geográfica
Brasileiro, 1963), 63.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., 64.
14 Ibid., 66.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
231
“CIVILIZING” THE AMAZON: AMERINDIANS AND THE PORTUGUESE
CROWN’S STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGNTY, 1650-1777 
the mid-seventeenth century, but Mendonça Furtado rejected the Jesuit argu-
ment that the Pope’s edicts trumped those of the king. In addition, the governor
claimed that royal orders having to do with the liberty of natives were forever
“compromised,” and the religious orders inflicted “the most rigorous of slaver-
ies that could be imagined.”18
In the governor’s estimation, the temporal and political power conceded to
the missionaries in 1686 and 1688 to govern the Amazon had resulted in insub-
ordination on the part of the religious orders. He complained that, through these
concessions of power, the missionaries, especially the Jesuits, were convinced
that all of the Indian villages belonged to them, with the king and the governor
having nothing to do with governing. More importantly, this power translated
into a control over the labour force in the region. The missionaries felt that they
could freely take advantage of their monopoly over native labour, “ruining with
it a considerable commerce, of not only the royal treasury, but the market in
general, and the plantations and farms in particular.”19 A similar concern
existed with the collection of Amazon rainforest products. The Company of
Jesus had the most native canoes at their disposal for obtaining these products,
as well as controlling the fishing activities, production of meat, and the pro-
duction of turtle butter. In addition, by virtue of their religious tasks, the Jesuit’s
products were exempt from taxes, which further hurt the treasury. Since labour,
not land, was the most important factor of production, to use modern economic
jargon, the Jesuits were far wealthier than the settlers and the religious orders
controlled the pace of the economic activity in the Amazon.20 Mendonça
Furtado worried that not only was the treasury reduced to scarcity, but also
colonists were reduced to “poverty and misery.”21
The crown demanded reform in a region where it enjoyed little to no real
power in the face of missionary government. However, Mendonça Furtado’s
appointment came with full powers to remedy the worrisome situation that for
decades had troubled the crown. Despite the fact that changes by former gov-
ernors had produced no visible results, Mendonça Furtado arrived with a clear
mandate from a new imperial administration, which had clear expectations for
reform in the Amazon.
The Public and Secret Instructions for Establishing Royal Control of the
Amazon
As it normally did when appointing colonial governors, the crown gave
Mendonça Furtado public and secret directions for conducting his government.
18 Ibid., 68.
19 Ibid., 70.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
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The instructions clearly demonstrate that the crown had a vested interest in
Amazonian colonization. Moreover, the project was highly classified, with the
instructions concluding: “You will keep this instruction secret and you will only
communicate the paragraphs and that you see fit for your government to the
governor of Maranhão in observance of my royal orders.”22
Given the vast size and governmental difficulties in the Amazon, the
instructions outlined important administrative changes. It was imperative that
the presence of royal authority be seen throughout the state of Grão Pará and
Maranhão, no matter where the Mendonça Furtado resided. Therefore, article
thirty-seven of the instructions appointed Luís de Vasconcelos Lobo as gover-
nor of Maranhão, subordinate to the governor and captain-general. Mendonça
Furtado’s mandate demanded that he stay in Belém to secure defence and pro-
mote Portuguese commercial interests. Therefore, two distinct administrative
sub-regions were established, the captaincy of Pará and the captaincy of
Maranhão, with the captaincy of Rio Negro (roughly the modern state of
Amazonas) soon following in 1753.23
Judging by the stern language of the instruction document, it is clear that
the monarch knew about the systematic failure on the part of the missionaries
and colonists to observe laws regarding the civilizing of natives and the devel-
opment of the Amazon region. More important, the first articles demonstrate
great trepidation about the state of colonization in the Amazon region. The
crown explained to the governor that the “public interest and the state profits
that [he] would administer [were] indispensably linked to business pertaining
to the conquest and freedom of natives.”24 Judging by the orders, it was appar-
ent that these attempts at control and liberty, best classified as assimilation,
would have to be executed in a radically different way from colonization
endeavours of the past. Many of Mendonça Furtado’s instructions emphasized
the problems associated with the liberation and captivity of natives.
Mendonça Furtado’s instructions to uphold the liberty and secure the civi-
lization of the Amerindian population were based on the laws of 1 April 1680
and the royal decree of 28 April 1688, which respectively banned native cap-
tivity and then allowed it in some cases. The crown insisted that problems of
the continuing existence of native slavery derived from the Mission Council’s
interpretation of the laws for its own benefit: “It found in them a pretext to
extend their power more than what was permitted.”25 Therefore, the Overseas
Council ordered on 13 July 1747 that all licences permitting the capture of
natives issued to the missions would be revoked and forces dedicated to their
22 José I to Mendonça Furtado, Lisbon, 31 May 1751, AEP, 38; BNL, R, CP, Cod. 625, 626. 
23 Ibid, 37.
24 Ibid., 26.
25 Ibid., 27.
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capture were to be withdrawn. On 28 May 1751, the crown issued a decree
declaring that no natives could be captured and enslaved, revoking all previous
laws concerning Indian slavery. In addition, all Indians used as labourers now
had to be paid a daily wage. Therefore, given the importance placed on reform-
ing native law, the crown specifically ordered Mendonça Furtado to be vigilant
in the area of native affairs, as it was one of the vital components in the crown’s
overall strategy in reforming the Amazon.
The abolition of native slavery – de jure and de facto – an institution on
which Amazonian society had rested since Portuguese colonization in the sev-
enteenth century, meant that an alternative source of labour was necessary. A
year before Mendonça Furtado’s appointment, the crown had ordered the com-
mencement of African slave imports into Grão Pará and Maranhão. Hence, one
on the governor’s principal mandates was to investigate the labour needs of the
region to better inform the crown of what was needed to implement a transat-
lantic slave trade. José I requested to know how many slaves would be required,
how many would have to be imported annually and what strategies would bet-
ter satisfy the needs of the colonists requiring labour.26 Moreover, the “more
intelligent and interested colonists,” who were interested in purchasing or
importing slaves, had to be consulted to start an active slave trade.27 Also, iden-
tifying methods of payment or trade goods to facilitate the slave trade was
imperative. Without finding goods to trade, the importation of African slaves
would not be a viable option.
Along with the introduction of slavery and the assimilation of the native
population, colonization required a concerted effort on the part of the crown to
introduce more Portuguese settlers to the Amazon. The crown planned a pro-
gram of immigration to Brazil from places such as the Azores and Madeira to
establish a Portuguese presence in the Amazon, which was a task to be orga-
nized by the new governor. However, settlement also had much to do with
strengthening production. The king warned the new governor that when the
new settlers arrived they were to be observed and be made accustomed to work-
ing on the land, “just as they practiced on the islands.”28 The many vereadores
(aldermen), plantation owners and farmers who arrived in Brazil traditionally
felt too self-important in the colonies to engage in farm work. Moreover, the
disdain for toil could often be taken as noble aspirations, something the sover-
eign clearly did not support.
Mendonça Furtado’s instructions reveal the crown’s objectives and
methodology, and consist mostly of warnings, advice, and insisting that Lisbon
be informed of all matters of governance. In the case of the privileges conceded
26 Ibid., 29.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., 82.
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to the missionaries established in Grão Pará and Maranhão, especially the
Society of Jesus, the language of the crown’s instructions is both stern and cau-
tious, specifically outlining reforms that had to be made in articles thirteen and
twenty-six. The king ordered the governor to consult with all of the regular
clergy and other ecclesiastics on the new laws for the use of native labour.29 In
the event that the missionaries did not comply with the laws, José I was
adamant that he would confiscate their land grants for the insubordination of
the missionaries served “as an embarrassment to the principal objective of why
the ecclesiastic peoples were sent to that state.”30 The instructions revealed a
Portuguese administration set on following through with its reform strategies.
By order of the king, the governor was to inspect all villages and report back to
the crown, with the cooperation of the secular church: “You will take the nec-
essary information and consult with the Bishop of Pará, whom I trust for having
a good prudent opinion and experience from the land and will instruct you with
the truth, to inform him that it will be better for the ecclesiastics to be left with
spiritual dominion.”31 Interestingly, even though the laws pertained to all
orders, the secular clergy, namely the Bishop of Pará, cooperated with the gov-
ernment, which suggested that the Jesuits, rather than all ecclesiastics, were
being targeted with these new laws. The Bishop, Miguel de Bulhões e Sousa, a
Dominican who had been in the diocese of Pará since 15 February 1749,
became the governor’s confidante and right-hand man in Grão Pará and
Maranhão.
Article twenty-seven clearly explained the objectives of the program for
occupation and settlement of the Amazon for reasons of sovereignty and
defence. It recommended that the governor should “intently find methods to
secure the state, as well as make commerce flourish.”32 To do so, native reduc-
tion villages with a few Portuguese settlers, especially along the frontier of the
captaincy, were required to extend the borders of the region in a short period of
time. Similarly, subsequent articles of instruction defined the crown’s strategies
for the defence of the territory. Of particular importance was the recommenda-
tion that the governor examine the operation of fortresses in the Amazon,
investigating the number of troops available, discipline, equipment, and avail-
able munitions, especially at the fortress of Macapá. In addition, the crown
commissioned a study to identify the need for new fortresses.
29 The regular clergy lived according to the rule of an established order and were withdrawn from
daily contact with lay people, as opposed to the secular clergy (namely the parish priests) who
ministered daily to non-ecclesiastics. 
30 Ibid., 29.
31 Ibid., 30.
32 Ibid., 35.
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The Era of the Society of Jesus
Portuguese expansion throughout the globe had long involved a close alliance
between the Church and the conquest. The missionaries accompanied the
sailors of Portuguese ships, not only to provide spiritual comfort when death
came upon the crews, but also to engage in contact with the Other, in order to
convert the subaltern into a Christian, into a “civilized” human being. Based on
the educative characteristics of these enthusiastic religious men, the govern-
ment understood missionaries as best suited and prepared to undertake the
arduous task of “civilizing.” In Brazil, the Society of Jesus (Jesuits) claimed the
right to disseminate this Christian ideology, especially after gaining promi-
nence during the Counter-Reformation of the mid-sixteenth century. The
Jesuits perceived themselves as the only genuine crusaders for Christ, defend-
ing and spreading faith, obeying only the Pope.
The missionaries, who in 1549 had accompanied the first governor general
of Brazil, Tomé de Sousa, especially Fathers Manuel da Nóbrega and José de
Anchieta, were instrumental in building Brazil as part of the Portuguese
empire.33 The first contingents of Jesuits helped in the 1560 victory over the
French in Fort Coligny, founding Rio de Janeiro, and moved south to São Paulo
de Piratininga, creating the mission that would give birth to the city of São
Paulo.34 Land grants, sacrificial spirit, belief in the obligation to convert the
gentile, and the “humanization” of Amerindians were pillars of the colonial
order. The Jesuits identified the Amerindian populations, namely the
Tupinamba, as docile, humble and capable of being molded, and quickly
changed not only their religious practices, but also all activities of social life
such as economics, education and culture. For three centuries, the Portuguese
crown had granted the Jesuits, and subsequently other religious orders, financ-
ing, honours, and authorization to establish and administer schools, villages,
and seminaries. The Jesuits carried out government policies outlining economic
development and the 1680 laws prohibiting native slavery, which went beyond
the spiritual realm, and concerned the secular life of aboriginal communities.
The first twenty years of the Jesuit presence in Brazil saw a major trans-
formation in the methods of evangelization. They replaced traditional nomadic
missions with settlements that consisted of a primary residence, a college and
an aldéia (Indian village). The residence housed missionaries, while the col-
leges served as centres to educate recruits and local elites. However, as Isabel
dos Guimarães Sá argues, the evangelization of the native population took
33 Isabel dos Guimarães Sá, “Conversion in Portuguese America,” in The Spiritual Conversion
of the Americas, ed. James Muldoon (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2004), 197. 
34 Jean-Claude Laborie, ed., La mission jésuite du Brésil: Lettres et autres documents (1549-
1570) (Paris: Chandeigne, 1998), 7-62.
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place primarily in the villages.35 The Jesuit missionaries convinced the Indians
to settle in new villages, where they would be available for religious instruc-
tion. In the captaincy of Maranhão, formed after the expulsion of the French
from the mouth of the Amazon in 1615, development of these villages occurred
primarily in the eighteenth century, coinciding with the growth of the Jesuit
population.36
By the mid-eighteenth century, the remote Amazon missions were rich in
comparison to the other colonists and residents. Although other religious orders
also administered villages, Jesuit organization, much more temporal than spir-
itual, provided self-sufficiency and autonomy and gave the Society of Jesus
more social and economic power than other settlers, including the civil ser-
vants. By the mid-eighteenth century, the Jesuits controlled nineteen villages,
the Carmelites controlled sixteen, the Franciscans of Saint Anthony controlled
nine, the Franciscans of Mercy controlled nine, the Franciscans of Conceição
da Beira controlled seven and Mercederian friars controlled two, for a total of
sixty-two villages surrounding the Amazon River and its tributaries.37
However, apart from these missions, the Jesuits acquired estates through pur-
chase or inheritance on which they used native and slave labour. Inventories
made in 1759, when the Society of Jesus was expelled from the Portuguese
empire, note that the Jesuits owned twenty-five cattle ranches, three sugar-mills
and one pottery-mill.38 On the island of Marajó alone, the Jesuits managed
ranches holding over 100,000 head of cattle.39 They also marketed native prod-
ucts from the Amazon, such as drugs, cloves, cacao and cinnamon, and
transported them by fleets of canoes to warehouses in Belém. Yet, control over
labour rather than property ownership determined the wealth of the order, as
large tracts of land could easily be abandoned and commodities could not be
collected or produced without a workforce, whether Indian or African slave.
The missionaries carried out the distribution of Indian labour for the ser-
vice of colonists, resulting in many grievances and petitions to the Overseas
Council concerning a shortage of workers. The colonists accused the mission-
aries of hoarding and unequally dividing labourers, insisting that they kept the
stronger and younger individuals, making the order’s business ventures more
competitive. Governor Francisco Xavier de Mendonça Furtado expressed his
frustration with the labour shortage, explaining that the Jesuits were “accus-
35 Sá, “Conversion,” 198.
36 Dauril Alden, The Making of Enterprise: The Society of Jesus in Portugal, Its Empire and
Beyond, 1540-1750 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 674-76.
37 Renata Araújo, As cidades da Amazónia no século XVIII: Belém, Macapá e Mazagão (Porto:
FAUP Publicações, 1992), 98.
38 Ibid., 99.
39 Kenneth Maxwell, Pombal: The Paradox of the Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), 58.
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tomed to being the absolute lords of all of these people, because rarely comes
the year when the settlers are given their rightful share.”40 More importantly,
missionaries maintained a close relationship with the natives that often meant
that natives were more willing or felt more obligated to work on land held by
the religious orders. Mendonça Furtado interpreted this situation as being
indicative of a master/slave relationship:
These facts are made even more scandalous when you realize that not only do
those 1,550 Indians belong to those priests, but apart from them, they have
infinite private settlements at their service … in which they keep a infinite
number of these miserable Indians as enlisted serfs, where they live in a hard
and rigorous form of slavery, without a way of getting out from now until the
end of the world.41
Although the plight of the natives concerned the governor, much of his rhetoric
had more to do with the economic development of the Amazon region and the
perception that the Jesuits hindered growth due to their monopoly on labour and
their tax exemptions, a problem that had bothered the Pombaline administra-
tion.
Mendonça Furtado: Frustrated Governor
As early as three months after his arrival in Belém in 1751, Mendonça Furtado
was well aware of the conflict between the Jesuits and the administration over
implementing the government’s plan for developing the Amazon. His preoccu-
pation with the Jesuits compelled him to write his brother on several occasions,
not only to explain the problem, but also to seek advice on the measures that
should be taken against the Jesuits. He complained that “they [did] not care
about the king, court, governor, or any sort of government or justice; they con-
sider[ed] themselves sovereigns and independent.”42 More suspicion of the
Jesuits was fuelled by the apparent insubordination of the Society of Jesus. In
one instance, the governor asked the Jesuit representative to transfer a Jesuit
friar, João de Sousa, after two native elders from the village of Piraviri com-
plained that he had used violence to punish the community for getting drunk
during a marriage celebration. Mendonça Furtado was appalled when the Jesuit
official replied coldly that he neither wanted to move, nor should the govern-
ment move Sousa.43 In addition, he complained that the Jesuits exuded
40 Mendonça Furtado to Pombal, Belém, 10 September 1754, AEP, 582-83.
41 Ibid., 583. When Mendonça Furtado spoke of the “private settlements,” he meant those where
Portuguese settlers were not entitled to a share of native labour, namely because these settle-
ments were too far from where labour was required. 
42 Mendonça Furtado to Pombal, Belém, 29 December 1751, AEP, 143-148.
43 Ibid.
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“unparalleled arrogance and inexplicable pride” after receiving orders to estab-
lish villages in Javarí and Japorá from the Confessor, José Moreira.44
However, Mendonça Furtado’s initial instructions from the crown in 1751
demonstrated that the metropolis had long suspected the Jesuits’ economic
practices, and that concern over the Jesuit control of natives had much more to
do with money than with humanitarianism. King José I suggested that
Mendonça Furtado should investigate the wealth and capital of the Jesuits with
“great caution, circumspection, and prudence.”45 The crown ordered the gov-
ernor to observe the Jesuit treatment of natives and to convince the settlers that
“it was more useful to have [Indians] who willingly and voluntarily served,”
than having to use a system of forced labour.46 The colonists also fuelled ten-
sions between the governor and the Jesuits with constant claims that the
religious order’s protection of Indians (or monopoly over their labour) had
deprived the colonists of workers, especially since African slaves were too
costly. Furthermore, Mendonça Furtado expressed interest in the turtles, cloves
and drugs that the natives acquired for the Jesuits, and questioned the order’s
requests for government funds as they obviously profited from trade. Instead,
the governor wished to encourage secular colonist trade that would be subject
to taxation. Taxation likewise concerned colonists, who demanded reforms that
would remove the religious orders’ customs exemptions to create fair market
conditions.47 Similarly, Mendonça Furtado viewed all religious orders, espe-
cially the Society of Jesus, as potential threats to the economic development of
the Amazon, because too much capital was tied up in their estates and did not
circulate in a market economy:
It is necessary to settle on two true, clear and evident principles. The first is
that this state was founded, flourished, infinite sugar mills and plantations
were established, while the religious did not have this high and absolute
power. Second, after they had it (power) everything was ruined, confused and
finally reduced to nothing, because the religious communities took all of the
commerce that should revolve around the market … taking profit from the
public and the royal treasury.48
Regardless of the approach taken by Mendonça Furtado to encourage trade in
the region, reforms were difficult to implement if they did not receive the sup-
port of the Jesuits.
44 Ibid.
45 José I to Mendonça Furtado, Lisbon, 31 May 1751, AEP, 26-31.
46 Ibid.
47 Manuel Lopes to José I, Belém, 5 May 1752, Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (hereafter cited
as AHU), Pará, caixa 33, doc. 3096.
48 José I to Mendonça Furtado, Lisbon, 31 May 1751, AEP, 26-31.
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After 1621, the crown granted the state of Maranhão its own administra-
tive apparatus after it separated the region from the control of the state of
Brazil.49 The Overseas Council in Lisbon handled all matters of government,
aside from religious responsibilities. A civil service, made up of a governor, a
high judge and the purveyor of the exchequer, had authority over the captain-
cies of Maranhão and Pará, while each respective captaincy had a captain
general, a judge and a purveyor who were accountable to their state superiors.
Other secretaries of state, such as supreme court judges, could also issue orders
to the state concerning matters specific to their offices.
Despite the government framework, control of the Amazon region in the
eighteenth century was firmly in the hands of the Society of Jesus and not royal
administration. Not only were royal orders ignored, but the governor and the
other civil servants wielded little power. Understanding the difficulties in
administering the region, Mendonça Furtado endeavoured to suppress Jesuit
privileges, reclaim control of Amerindian labour, and restructure the state appa-
ratus. Immediately, he convened the Missions Council, consisting of the
executive state officials, the Bishop of Maranhão, and prelates of the religious
orders, in order to establish a minimum salary for native workers, thus creating
a workforce willing to labour for the colonists and addressing the Jesuit fears
that settlers would enslave natives:
Sir, I convened the Missions Council to arbitrate the salary that should be paid
to the Indians from now on, understanding the quality of their work, and the
poverty in which we find this state; it was unanimously agreed that each
Indian [farm and domestic labourer] should be paid 400 reis per month, 600
reis for pilots and oarsman, and officials 1 tostão per day, and food for all.50
Surprisingly, establishing a minimum wage for the native population did not
incite controversy. Yet, these negotiations were the first steps taken towards a
new policy for social organization in the Amazon.
The First Imperial Efforts to Consolidate Power
Through the introduction of administrative reforms, Mendonça Furtado
changed the colonial power structure and began to remove the autonomy of the
missions and, within a decade, transferred authority to the state. The adminis-
tration controlled all of the essential initiatives required to change the
Amerindian population, and anticipated that through these proposals a “civi-
49 Stuart B. Schwartz, Sovereignty and Society in Colonial Brazil: The High Court of Bahia and
its Judges, 1609-1751 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 162.
50 Mendonça Furtado to Diogo de Mendonça Côrte Real, Belém, 22 December 1751, AEP, 131;
One tostão was equal to 1000 reis
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lized” and assimilated population would emerge, or at least a productive and
lucrative population, subject to the king. Directly inspired by the changing
political and social ideals of the eighteenth century, this reconfiguration of the
social order was imperative for the Portuguese government that wanted to posi-
tion itself as an enlightened administration. Despite the fact that the colony
began to be territorially defined, demarcated and recognized by foreign gov-
ernments with the Treaty of Madrid, the ideology of enlightened absolutism
practiced by the metropolis depended on a new relationship being formed
between the natives and the colonial power, focusing on the king and his state
apparatus. This imperial affiliation, built on subordination, produced a new
conversion philosophy, one that put aside Christian criteria in order to promote
the virtues of civilization and the right to property so that under the same law
every individual, regardless of race, could feel honoured and dignified being
the subject of the king. From this humanistic and enlightened ideological per-
spective, Mendonça Furtado revised the laws of native liberty.
The Pombaline administration entrusted Mendonça Furtado with a man-
date to liberate the Amerindian population, whose status had been a point of
contention for many years. In Amazonian society, everyone – colonists and
missionaries alike – depended on native labour. Several laws were enacted
throughout the seventeenth century to curb the capture and enslavement of the
Amerindian populations. On 17 October 1653, the government passed a law
that banned the capture of natives, except if they were imprisoned during a “just
war,” for theft, for avoiding fiscal obligations (such as tributary labour), or if
they practiced cannibalism.51 Later, on 1 April 1680, the law was amended
because of abuse and difficulty in determining “just cause” for enslavement,
especially in the state of Maranhão. However, with the expansion of the
Amazonian frontier, more offensive and defensive wars were fought, and laws
against taking native slaves meant that Indian prisoners would most likely be
executed by colonists rather than be held captive. Therefore in 1688, the gov-
ernment rescinded the 1680 law and returned to a modified 1653 law. Later, all
captured natives were administrated by the holy orders, and subsequently the
ecclesiastics were to report all incidences of native slavery at the hands of
colonists.52 Even though laws prohibiting slavery were enacted, natives were
“administered,” which often was a form of disguised slavery, depending on the
character of their employers, including the missionaries.
Obviously, Mendonça Furtado realized that an alternative labour force was
needed before natives could be freed from labour obligations. It was quite com-
51 Francisco Ribeiro da Silva, “A legislação seiscentistas portuguesa e os índios do Brasil,” in
Brasil: Colonização e escravidão, ed. Maria Beatriz Nizza da Silva (Rio de Janeiro: Editora
Nova Fronteira, 1999), 20.
52 Ibid., 21.
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mon for the colonists to petition the king for affordable access to African slaves
to create a large alternative workforce, especially in light of epidemics that dev-
astated the native communities.53 In 1754, Mendonça Furtado wrote a series of
letters to his brother outlining the pleas of some colonists to establish a monop-
oly company to facilitate the importation of African slave labour to the Amazon
region. He reasoned that, if African slaves could provide the bulk of a work-
force, the colonists would not feel the need to enslave and abuse the native
population. In turn, a new workforce would enable more production and poten-
tial for trade, which meant that natives could theoretically be freed from labour
obligations. Considering that the “absolute power” of the Society of Jesus
rested on their ability to control native labour, Mendonça Furtado felt that
establishing a monopoly company to obtain slave labour would also be the best
way to eradicate the Jesuit sphere of influence.54
In 1755, the Marquis of Pombal acted quickly on his brother’s advice and
enacted legislation that founded the Company of Grão Pará and Maranhão and
wrote a decree to enact the complete liberty and integration of the native pop-
ulation, removing them from the supervision of the religious orders.55 On 6
June 1755, the Portuguese court issued a law concerning Indians being given
“equal” rights and obligations, essentially receiving legal equality with the
white population. The natives would be free to work for whomever they
desired, for a predetermined salary. The next day, 7 June 1755, another law
establishing a civil government for the Indians was released. All priests and
missionaries were to be excluded from government roles as “secular govern-
ment was far from the obligations of priesthood.”56 Temporal government of
the natives would be given to the ordinary judges, councilmen, and justice offi-
cials, and to the Indian chiefs of each village, who were to govern according to
Portuguese law.
The Indian Directorate
Commonly referred to as the Indian Directorate, Mendonça Furtado authored
the Directorate that Should be Observed in the Settlements of the Indians of
Pará and Maranhão until His Majesty Should Order the Contrary, which was
53 Conselho Ultramarino to João V, Lisbon, 16 May 1750, AHU, CU, Pará, caixa 31, doc. 2976;
Moradores to José I, Belém, 15 February 1754, AHU, CU, Pará, caixa 36, doc. 3342.
54 Mendonça Furtado to Pombal, Belém, 20 February 1754, AHU, CU, Pará, caixa 36, doc. 3347;
Mendonça Furtado to Diogo de Mendonça Corte Real, Belém, 18 January 1754, AEP, 456-59;
Mendonça Furtado to Pombal, Belém, 26 January 1754, AEP, 465-70.
55 Instituição da Companhia Geral do Grão Pará e Maranhão (Lisbon: Officina de Miguel
Rodrigues, 1755).
56 Mathias C. Kiemen, “The Status of the Indian in Brazil after 1820,” The Americas 21:3 (1965):
263.
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released on 3 May 1758.57 The Directorate, approved by royal decree on 17
August 1758, expressed the pedagogical goals of Mendonça Furtado. He
desired that the natives become “civilized” men and women. Interestingly, the
emancipation law of 6 June 1755 was kept secret until the opportune time, on
Pombal’s instructions.58 However, Mendonça Furtado was aware that problems
might occur:
As one who had dealt with them [the indigenous population] on a day-to-day
basis and who has lived in their settlements for two years, [that] the most pious
intentions of his majesty will be frustrated if these miserable and rustic igno-
rants are totally placed in control of their own affairs … and since it is not
possible to pass from one extreme to the other without seeking some means
by which it is possible to obtain the objective [of the legislation] I see no more
appropriate measure than to place in each settlement a man with the title of
director.59
Despite the cautionary tone of the governor’s advice, a civil service that
planned to aid natives with the process of integration quickly replaced the
Jesuits. The crown zealously implemented the Directorate to establish an
enlightened government which could effectively control the Amazon.
On the other hand, if the Pombaline government were to claim authority
for the state in the vast region, the Amazon had to be inhabited with individu-
als loyal to José I, such as assimilated natives. In order for foreign surveyors to
be contracted to demarcate the border between the Portuguese and the Spanish
empires, the immense area required a population occupying the territory, which
was claimed under the international law of uti possidetis.60 Pombal expressed
the importance of inhabitants: 
57 Directório que se deve observar nas Povoações dos índios do Pará e Maranhão em quanto Sua
Magestade não mandar o contrário (Lisbon: Officina de Miguel Rodrigues, 1758); ANTT,
MSS. Livraria, Livro 962, 118-41v; Joaquim Ignacio de Freitas and Feliciano de Cunha França,
Collecção chronológica de leis extravagantes: posteriores à nova compilação das ordenações
do reino, publicadas em 1603, tomo 4 (Coimbra: Real Imprensa da Universidade, 1819), 465.
58 Initially, it appears that the law of 6 June 1755 was to be secret; however, the wait for enact-
ment could also have much to do with the Lisbon earthquake that took place 1 November
1755, because this legislative package was only sent to Mendonça Furtado the following year.
The Directorate was ordered in 1757 and ratified in 1758. 
59 Official letter from Mendonça Furtado to the crown, Belém, 21 May 1757, cited in Maxwell,
Pombal, 59.
60 Uti possidetis is the law of possession. It was used in South America to demarcate lands that
belonged to the Portuguese and Spanish as they scrambled to the centre of the continent, push-
ing for more territory. Essentially, the Portuguese crown claimed that since its settlements were
west of the original international boundaries set by the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494, they were
sovereigns of that territory. However, based on this argument, the Portuguese had to ensure
that enough settlers loyal to the crown were present so as to extend the border as far west as
possible and to keep the Spaniards from reneging on their territorial concessions.
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As the power and wealth of all countries consists principally in the number
and multiplication of the people that inhabit it … this number and multiplica-
tion of people is most indispensable now on the frontiers of Brazil for their
defence.”61
Continental Portugal, the Azores and Madeira were not able to supply enough
people to colonize the Brazilian colonies and defend the territory. Therefore,
the solution had to rest in the population that already inhabited Brazil and
assimilation. By removing all differences between the Indians and the
Portuguese, he felt that natives would no longer feel subjugated, resulting in
miscegenation and loyalty to the crown. 
Pombal’s instructions and subsequent laws concerning the status of Indians
incensed the Jesuits as their protectionist Indian policy had been devised pre-
cisely to isolate the Indians from exploitation by the settlers and to discourage
integration with the Portuguese.62 Based on past experiences, the Jesuits
believed that removing their protection would decimate the Amerindian popu-
lation. In addition, even though the Treaty of Madrid (1750) did not negatively
affect the Jesuit missionaries by displacing missions in the Amazon as they did
in upper Uruguay, the Jesuits in Grão Pará and Maranhão obstructed the crown
patrols that kept Spanish colonists from pushing east, which the missionaries
viewed as an act of solidarity in support of their uprooted southern brothers.63
Every time that the Jesuits were asked to prepare boats, oarsmen and provi-
sions, boats would be dismantled, and oarsmen and provisions could not be
found in the region.64 Mendonça Furtado lamented that “there is nobody to pad-
dle the canoes, and in every hinterland settlement there are no provisions,”
adding that the task of demarcation had become arduous as “all the religious
were against him.”65 Mendonça Furtado complained that even when the Jesuits
were consulted to aid in border demarcation, they remained indifferent and,
despite their ability to aid the situation by providing labour and provisions, they
did not help the governor.66 Pombal deemed their indifference to defence a
61 Pombal to Gomes Freire Andrada, 21 September 1751, in Carneiro de Mendonça, O Marquês
de Pombal e o Brasil (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1960), 188.
62 Maxwell, Pombal, 53.
63 The Treaty of Madrid was a document signed by Spain and Portugal concerning their empires
in what is now Brazil. It allowed for further expansion of the Portuguese empire, west of the
former limit of the 46th meridian, at the expense of the Spanish empire. In their attempt to
demarcate the new frontier, the Spanish and Portuguese armies met the resistance of the seven
(Spanish Jesuit) missions of the upper Uruguay that did not want their missions going to the
Portuguese, sparking the Guarani War.
64 Visconde de Carnaxide, O Brasil na administração pombalina (Rio de Janeiro: Companhia
Editora Nacional, 1940), 149.
65 Mendonça Furtado to Pombal, Belém, 10 September 1754, BNL, R, CP Cod. 11393, 21-23.
66 Mendonça Furtado to Pombal, Belém, 16 September 1754, BNL, R, CP, Cod. 11393, 17;
Mendonça Furtado to Pombal, 1 October 1754, BNL, R, CP, Cod. 11393, 7-9.
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form of treason and their obstructionism suggested that the presence of the
Jesuits in Portuguese territory hindered Portuguese imperial expansion. 
In the law of 6 June 1755, José I prohibited the capture of natives and
returned to them their liberty, granting them dominion over their land and
goods. The law stated that the true reason why the discovery of Grão Pará and
Maranhão had not resulted in civilizing and integrating more natives was that
the crown failed to “efficiently sustain the liberty of Indians.”67 It asserted that
the natives had been banished to barbarianism and paganism, not able to seek
the comfort of temporal happiness in civilized communities, and that reform
was the only means to remedy the situation.
Considering that granting the Amerindian population liberty without ced-
ing them a means of subsistence would not be viable, the government instructed
that the section four in the royal decree of 1 April 1680 was to be immediately
re-enacted. The section ordered: 
And for these Gentiles in this way liberated and others here present, it is bet-
ter to stay in the villages; it is good that they be lords of their own property,
as they are in the wilderness, without it being taken, or on [their property] be
threatened. And the governor, with the advice of the said religious, will assign
those who leave the wilds, convenient places for them to clear and cultivate;
and they may not be moved from those places against their will, nor will they
be obliged to pay rent, or any tribute for those lands; even if they are desig-
nated to be allotted to private persons.68
This decree – which emanated from the sovereign, the opinion expressed by the
Overseas Council, and educated men – provided the Indian population of Grão
Pará and Maranhão with all of the autonomy, dignity and honour of being a sub-
ject of the king.
On 7 July 1755, José I released a law prohibiting the clergy from govern-
ing the temporal affairs of natives. The decree invoked canon law and appealed
to Catholic philosophy. Essentially, the government argued that since canon law
prohibited “ecclesiastics, as ministers of God and His Church to be involved in
secular government,” political participation was completely contradictory to
their religious obligations.69 The prohibition “most urgently” targeted the mis-
sion priests; the men of the Society of Jesus were incapable of venturing into
forums outside of religious matters because of “the strength of their vows,” and
the Franciscans’ “humility was incompatible with the civil and criminal juris-
diction of the empire.”70 Apart from using ecclesiastical reasoning, José I
67 Colecção de leis extravagantes, 421-434.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid., 465.
70 Ibid.
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explained that he, as protector of his kingdom and dominion, enacted these new
laws to guard the sacred canons and apostolic constitutions. Therefore, using
the ecclesiastical discourse of the missionaries, he argued that if they were the
defenders of the Amerindian population then he, as the sovereign bound to pro-
tect his subjects, was the guardian of the sacred ministries; it was his duty to
protect the natives so that the clergy could fulfill their vows.71 The pronounce-
ment cancelled all other laws, decrees and instructions given to the missionaries
by the crown in relation to natives. The choice of words for the law reveals that
the Jesuits were the principal target: “It is good to declare, that in this way, the
aforementioned Society and its members, as others from any religion, have no
temporal jurisdiction over Indian government, that they may aid and reside in
the state to be upright and all workers in the Lord’s vineyard.”72 Meanwhile,
the right to perform all religious functions, such as tutoring the Indians, went to
the secular clergy that at the time numbered less than the regulars, undermin-
ing the Jesuits further.
By removing the regular clergy from their role of guardians of the natives,
an administrative vacuum would be created. The monarchy identified the prob-
lem as a need to “govern the villages,” and gave the responsibility for the civil
service offices to the judges, town councillors, and justice officials in that all
major issues could be directed to the respective offices of the state. In other
words, all authority over the native people in the territory was transferred to the
state with its various levels of government, so that they could assimilate into
colonial society on equal terms as the colonists.
The Indian Directorate, written by Mendonça Furtado on 3 May 1757,
came in the midst of the government’s desire to abolish the secular power of the
regular clergy and to emancipate the natives, as expressed in the decree of the
6 and 7 June 1755. The Directorate contained ninety-five articles and can be
considered a “Declaration of the Rights of Natives” in respect to emancipation
law. The document was understood as a legal code or a culmination of all of the
proposed Indian laws of the kingdom that aspired to separate the legal from the
illegal, defined new laws, and conferred power and legitimacy on the lay insti-
tutions. For all intents and purposes, the Directorate, under the authority of the
state, legally placed the natives under Portuguese sovereignty, as subjects of the
king in practice and in theory so that they could be integrated into the rest of
society.
In August 1758, José I approved the entire Directorate and ordered the doc-
ument’s distribution to all branches of government so that it could be followed
and enforced. Demonstrating the zeal with which the “civilizing” project was
approached, the decree affirmed “royal and absolute power,” insisting that it
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
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would enable natives to integrate more and more into society, until they would
“live civilly.”73 Subsequently, the crown authorized the royal printer, Miguel
Rodrigues, to proceed with the publication of the Directorate. Over 300 copies
were sent to the Brazilian colonies so that they could be distributed among the
governors and other authorities for an efficient implementation of the reform.
Extensively applied throughout the Brazilian colonies, the law remained in
effect until Governor-General Francisco Maurício de Sousa Coutinho pushed
the crown to abolish it in 1798.
When the Directorate became law, it conferred upon the civil authorities of
the state of Grão Pará and Maranhão the power and legitimacy that formed a
legislative structure that supported the “civilizing” program of the Portuguese
empire. The object of the agenda was to transform marginal regions of the
Amazon basin – unknown and inhospitable – into a network of villages sus-
tained by an expanding economy, a model that could be integrated into the rest
of the global empire. In many respects, the Directorate structured and guided
all Amazonian projects in that judges, town councillors, and justice officials
made decisions revolving around business and the settlement of villages and
towns (both new and old). Specifically, the director of the Indians, a civil ser-
vant responsible for orienting and administering the Amerindians, formed a link
between the natives and the colonial government.74 Meanwhile, spiritual guid-
ance and Christianization came in the form of secular priests, who fit into the
structure of government, and were led by the prelate of the diocese working in
conjunction with the director of the Indians.75
According to the Directorate’s terms, the responsibilities attributed to the
director were fundamental in restructuring power relations in the Amazon,
touching on all aspects of human activity and comportment: civic, social and
moral. Article five clearly stated that, “the civilization of the Indians is the
entire responsibility of the directors.” Of primary importance was instruction in
Portuguese, seen as a vital means of conquest.76 Mendonça Furtado empha-
sized that the Portuguese language was necessary to drive out barbarity from
the rustic populations, maintaining that a common language would strengthen
the region and the empire. In fact, he openly criticized the Jesuits for learning
native languages for the purpose of evangelization instead of stressing
Portuguese, stressing that native tongues were “gibberish invented for confu-
sion and the total separation” and was “a notorious loss to human society.”77
73 Decree approving the Directorate, 18 August 1758, Ibid., 187.
74 Directório que se deve observar nas Povoações dos índios do Pará e Maranhão em quanto
Sua Magestade não mandar o contrário (Lisbon: Officina de Miguel Rodrigues, 1758),
Articles 5, 9, 10 and 92.
75 Ibid., Article 4.
76 Ibid., Article 6.
77 Mendonça Furtado to Pombal, Belém, 21 November 1751, AEP, 63-78.
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Therefore, the Directorate instructed that in every settlement there were to be
two schools, divided along gender lines. The boys would learn to read, write
and count, while the girls would learn to read, write, spin, crochet and sew, with
each sex under the instruction of a teacher of the same gender.78 More impor-
tantly, Jesuits were not to teach these schools. Unfortunately, the secularization
of schools in Brazil did not prove very successful, due to the vacuum created
when the Jesuits (famous for their colleges and education) were expelled in
1759.79 Lack of human resources and funding derailed a rather ambitious plan
in the larger project of assimilation.80
Despite the equal status of Indians before the law, it was obvious that prej-
udice would continue to stratify the population in a system of racial hierarchy.
In order to address the problem, the Directorate prohibited the use of the term
negro, meaning black or slave, to describe the Amerindian population, demon-
strating that natives were seen as racially superior to the Africans, while
distancing the Indians from the stigma of slavery.81 Instead, the decree implied
that class was a better form of classification: “Treat them with the distinction
they are due, according to their rank, employment and wealth.”82 However, the
very fact that natives were ordered to select Portuguese surnames suggests that
racial lines remained in that European names remained superior. Mendonça
Furtado believed that the new names would encourage the natives to live more
virtuously.83
The law empowered the director to attempt to assimilate the population
through more personal and social means. The director, charged with ensuring
that natives lived in decorum and comfort, had to establish rules of “human dig-
nity.” Nudity for example was prohibited for reasons of honour and honesty,
especially for women. The vice of drunkenness was seen as leading people
astray from a civilized life: “It impedes the reaching of honours and human and
civic dignity, which are now available.” Even family dwellings were regulated
under the directory system. Homes changed to better suit nuclear families,
rather than extended families, in order to promote chastity. Likewise, assimila-
tion came with the uniformity and structured ordering of new settlements. The
director, in collaboration with the settlers, was to build a church, town hall and
78 Directório, Articles 8 and 9.
79 Hemming, 479.
80 Maxwell, 96.
81 C.R. Boxer, Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire, 1415-1825 (London: Oxford
University Press, 1963); E. Franklin Frazier, “Some Aspects of Race in Brazil,” Phylon 3:3
(1942): 288.
82 Directório, Articles 9, 10, 11.
83 Barbara Ann Sommer, “Negotiated Settlements: Native Amazonians and Portuguese Policy in
Pará, Brazil, 1758-1798” (PhD. diss., The University of New Mexico, 2000), 75.
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jail in every community. Similarly, judges, town councillors and justice offi-
cials administered these communities and kept track of the population.84
Miscegenation was a means to introduce assimilation at a more personal,
but probably more profound, manner. Every village was to accept European
immigrants in their communities not only to boost economic development, but
also to promote communication between the two different cultures. The former
exclusion of Portuguese settlers from mission villages was seen as problematic,
but the Directorate opened the villages to Europeans so that natives could emu-
late their lifestyle.85 Moreover, marriage between Europeans and natives was
not only accepted, but was also encouraged to promote assimilation.
Miscegenation became an official policy when the crown permitted marriage
between the Portuguese and the natives on 4 April 1755.86
The Directorate also provided a real labour code, which had been lacking
until 1758. Natives had to be productive to encourage economic prosperity. The
director had to encourage the natives to cultivate their land and persuade them
to succeed in agriculture by not just growing crops for subsistence, but also sur-
plus crops for the market. The cultivation of cotton became quite popular in
Maranhão as the indigenous women knew the technique for spinning and weav-
ing cotton. Yet, everything about agricultural production had to be scrutinized
by the director so that he could evaluate the products. The crown obliged the
farmers to pay a tax of ten percent on the production of their goods, and each
village was supposed to have warehouse where that share was kept. Likewise,
the director’s salary consisted of one-sixth of all of crops destined to market
and for that reason he was very careful to coordinate harvest days with trans-
portation for city markets were more lucrative.87
Regulations also applied to the transport and commercialization of drugs,
which for many colonists were a chief source of income. Articles fifty and fifty-
seven of the Directorate defined the rules that had to be observed for the trade.
Village officials had to prepare the canoes destined to the jungle to collect
drugs. Of the amount collected, one tenth went to the Royal Treasury; then
costs for the expedition were paid; then the ship’s corporal had to be paid; sub-
sequently, the director would take one-sixth as payment; lastly, the leftover
amount was divided between the Indians. The buyers paid taxes for products
such as coffee, cacao, and cloves.88
84 Directório, Articles 75, 77, 78, 79. 
85 Directório, Article 85; Colin MacLachlan, “The Indian Directorate: Forced Acculturation in
Portuguese America, 1757-1799” The Americas 28:4 (1972), 362.
86 Miguel de Bulhões e Sousa to José I, Belém, 4 August 1755, AHU, CU, Pará, caixa 38, doc.
3568; Manuel Bernardo Melo e Castro to Tomé Joaquim Corte Real, Belém, 31 July 1759,
AHU, CU, Pará, caixa 45, doc. 4100.
87 Directório, Articles 39 and 43.
88 Directório, Article 7.
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The Directorate labour code outlined in articles fifty-nine and sixty-four
was a meticulous record of all available labour. All people between the ages of
thirteen and sixty had to register in two ledgers: one destined for the governor
and the other to a judge. These ledgers were to be systematically updated and
showed entries, exits and absences. Labour was divided in thirds in the follow-
ing order: (1) for the missionaries, (2) for the service of colonists, and (3) for
the service of the towns. All colonists had to pay the natives a minimum salary
through the director. In turn, he was in charge of all village business, obliged to
know everything about his community and relayed that information to the gov-
ernor via lists, maps and guides. Essentially, he formed one part of an
administrative hierarchy.
Despite the fact that the Directorate was touted as a humanizing document,
the voices of the natives were silenced by the mechanism of colonial govern-
ment. Article ninety-one summarizes a true “Declaration of the Rights of
Indians:” “We hold their people in esteem; we do not despise their alliances; we
hope their relationship is cordial, and we sincerely [want] to preserve that reci-
procal union that strengthens and establishes a solid happiness of Republics.”89
However, were the Amerindians prepared and willing to collaborate in this
imposed social reordering? 
The Directorate in Practice
It is obvious that the Directorate was a complete contradiction between its
alleged respect for tradition and customs, and the obligatory program of accul-
turation expressed by forced social and civil change. By looking at the process
used to arrive at the Directorate, one questions the humanitarian aspects of the
document. One finds, instead, the interests of the Indian taking a back-seat to
the Pombaline obsession with bringing down the missionary empires, espe-
cially those belonging to the Jesuits. In the end, the Directorate was not much
different than the former regime of Jesuits, with the exception being that a sec-
ular power was now in place.
The Portuguese crown might have been too ambitious in trying to imple-
ment the Directorate for the enlightenment document did not consider the
realities of the Amazon. It was difficult to find men capable of undertaking the
reform strategy. Colin MacLachlan described the problem as having to do with
the Directorate’s ideal director, a “secular saint willing to sacrifice himself
when in reality, the majority of the settlers in Pará were desperate men locked
in a struggle for survival and economic gain.”90 Most directors were not very
educated and most were settlers wanting to earn fortunes. In 1762, Governor
Francisco de Sousa Coutinho described the new European settlers as worse
89 Directório, Article 91.
90 MacLachlan, “The Indian Directorate,” 369.
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“than a blood-thirsty leech,” and “more like a jaguar or a ferocious tiger.”91
Some directors were nothing more than petty despots who carried out their
administrative tasks without any regard to the native municipal officials. In
addition, problems with corruption meant that often the crown did not receive
its revenues, which led to excessive taxation. Directors took a greater percent-
age of revenue than they were due. More often, they used natives to work on
their own property or obtain goods on their behalf instead of sharing the native
labourers with other settlers. Regardless of the way the Directorate reform was
not followed, the abuse of the native population was apparent and did not con-
tribute to any real change in native policy.92 Subsequently, the crown issued
disciplinary orders against abusive directors, but they were never implemented
effectively and directors continued to undermine the Directorate’s goals.93
While the Directorate aimed to establish new villages throughout Pará
based on European models, the administration did not seem to have been totally
successful. Rather, urbanization developed according to local demands. In fact,
people tended to live in houses built close to their gardens instead of the vil-
lages.94 Although carpenters, blacksmiths, potters, stonemasons, shoemakers,
barbers and sacristans stayed in villages, men working in the forests and canoes
would only come to the villages on days of celebration, the occasional Sunday,
or for business purposes. Desertion from native villages was common and wor-
risome, especially in settlements close to the Castilian border.95 There were also
challenges when it came to exemptions from the Directorate. The military, peo-
ple who married into Indian villages and their families, and immediate relatives
of town officials were not subject to the Directorate or most labour duties.96
Eventually, the general population increased relative to the population of the
Directorate villages and it was hard to establish new towns. Interestingly, natives
began to form their own villages, sometimes derived from patterns of protest.97
Directorate natives often fled to escape labour drafts. Reports filed to gov-
ernors concerning the availability of workers demonstrated that absenteeism
was a major reason for labour shortages.98 The constant shortage of Indian
91 Ibid., 370.
92 Luís Goes de Faria e Sousa to Mendonça Furtado, Belém, 16 December 1762, AHU, CU, Pará,
caixa 53, doc. 4877; Judge Feliciano Ramos Nobre Mourão to Mendonça Furtado, Belém, 17
June 1764, AHU, CU, Pará, caixa 57, doc. 5135.
93 João Pereira Caldas to Martinho de Melo e Castro, Belém, 2 March 1774, AHU, CU, Pará,
caixa 72, doc. 6114.
94 Sommer, “Negotiated Settlements,” 113.
95 João Pereira Caldas to Martinho de Melo e Castro, Belém, 4 November 1776, AHU, CU, Pará,
caixa 76, doc. 6352.
96 Sommer, “Negotiated Settlements,” 165.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid., 167; Cerzedello Jozé Vicente to governor, Serzedelo, 5 February 1776, Arquivo Público
do Estado de Pará (hereafter cited as APP), cod. 298; Population rolls, APP, cod. 408.
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workers for canoes and extracting rainforest drugs at times limited production
in the Amazon.99 The same could be said for state projects. While at building
projects, such as the fort at Macapá, men were overworked, poorly fed, and
exposed to disease. As the population declined, largely due to epidemics,
abuses became more frequent, including the keeping of natives beyond the
times stipulated in their contracts.100 Oarsmen would often not appear with
their canoes. Natives who temporarily fled usually went to their gardens,
Belém, a neighbouring town or a maroon community before returning home.
Some natives took a more radical approach and permanently escaped
Portuguese settlements. Many Directorate villages consisted of natives
descended from the original inhabitants joined by new arrivals from different
ethnic groups. Often, the size of settlements depended on whether or not the
distinct groups could coexist. Yet, new arrivals frequently fled to the forest and
their former way of life. Some runaways found it impossible to return to forest
groups because of ethnic differences or geographic distances and chose to
establish independent maroon communities called mocambos. Even though
they were independent, many maintained close ties to the Directorate villages,
going as far as competing for residents. In general, the crown did not try to
break up the maroon settlements for they were isolated and it would have
required a concerted military effort and resources.
Many natives took an active part in working within the Directorate system
to suit their own preferences. Apart from desertion, more natives sought
exemptions from the labour rolls. In many respects, the natives were aware of
their Directorate rights, choosing to operate within the system to achieve their
own goals. For example, when director João Pedro de Andrade became physi-
cally abusive and beat thirteen women in Alenquer, the mistreatment was
reported to Commander Pedro Miguel Ayres Pereira.101 Native leaders and vil-
lagers testified against the director, accusing him of misappropriating labour
and refusing to reveal the governor’s orders. They were aware that the orders
prohibited corporal punishment and the use of native labour for personal eco-
nomic gain and chose to direct their concerns to the director’s superior.
The Directorate policies enjoyed minimal success in implementing large-
scale settlement and “civilization” of the Amazon. Although the Directorate, as
outlined in its charter, appeared to be the ideal strategy for developing the
region, the regulations were impractical and did not take into account the harsh
environment, the lack of competent personnel, and the strength of native cul-
99 João Pereira Caldas to Martinho de Melo e Castro, Belém, 7 March 1773, AHU, CU, Pará,
caixa 70, doc. 5964; Manuel Pereira de Faria to Martinho de Melo e Castro, Lisbon, 6 July
1773, AHU, CU, Pará, caixa 71, doc. 6024.
100 Sommer, “Negotiated Settlements,” 168.
101 Hilario Francisco, Alenquer, 9 February 1792, APP, cod. 470; Sommer, “Negotiated
Settlements,” 166.
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ture.102 Other problems such as disease and population decline could not be
predicted and proved to be tremendous obstacles. These difficulties often meant
that “civilizing” the natives became a secondary thought. Secular education, a
lofty goal on the part of the administration, proved a bitter failure due to a lack
of teachers, funding, and the need to employ children in forest collecting. 
Yet, the Directorate did settle the Amazon basin and aided the crown in
asserting its sovereignty in the Amazon region. Even though great goals for the
social “civilization” of natives might not have been accomplished, the
Directorate set the spatial, psychological, and methodological patterns of set-
tlement for the future.103 The Directorate managed to build on existing
settlements involved in retrieving forest goods and agricultural production.
More importantly, the Directorate tied the villages economically to Belém, the
main port of exportation, joining the Amazon with global markets. These vil-
lages, loyal to the Portuguese crown, demonstrated the sovereignty of José I
and for the first time, started to define the territorial limits his domain. Also,
Pombal managed to uproot the Jesuits from their position of economic, social
and administrative control, replacing them with secular directors and crown
administration. Even though the Directorate was just one reform aimed at con-
trolling the native population, the ramifications went beyond colonizing the
native peoples, and fit into a larger multi-faceted Pombaline plan for crown’s
assertion of sovereignty. 
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